On a recent Citrix FAS deployment I’ve encountered the following error: “Request not supported” when logging in to a published application or desktop.
Article https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX218941 explains that re-enrollment of the domain controller authentication template or another custom template for Kerberos usage should resolve the error.
A little bit of a background on the environment, an already working Microsoft ADCS environment was in play and in use for other services. From a design/security perspective it was designed that two dedicated Microsoft ADCS servers would be used and two Citrix FAS servers connecting these new servers. The setup was working as expected but only above error would keep coming when trying to access an application or desktop.
We tried re-enrolling the domain controller authentication certificate and this didn’t do the trick, then we decided to let the Domain Controllers get the certificate from the new dedicated Microsoft ADCS servers for Citrix FAS and this did do the trick but with a side effect the chain is changed and other services would be negatively impacted so a rollback was needed.
With this information a Microsoft support case was created and ultimately they confirmed that what is mentioned in the Citrix support article should do the trick. Ok we got confirmation and yes it indeed does work when using the new ADCS servers but the issue of the original ADCS environment was still a mystery.
So next up we decided to repoint the Citrix FAS servers to the existing Microsoft ADCS server to root out any chain or other issues that might be in play. The result was exactly the same and a not supported request as the end result.
Digging deeper in the Microsoft ADCS environment it was after checking the “NTAuthCertificates” store that the existing server wasn’t there and the new servers were. This explained the smartcard logon not working when using the existing environment because an requirement for smartcard logon is that the “NTAuthCertificates” store has the issuing certificate authority propagated. After adding the certificate and waiting for replication and a reboot everything was working as expected, also when moving to the new Microsoft ADCS environment for certificate issuing.
See the following screenshot of the Enterprise PKI snap in MMC in which you can check and/or add the missing certificate:
See the following articles for extra information:
Very happy to share my first presentation on Virtual Expo with Erik Bakker, please click the following link for the recording and all other recordings as well.
Recently I got contacted by a customer who had problems performing an SSO to a newly build desktop environment.
The setup a greenfield resource domain and forest trust from an existing tenant with a two way trust. Basically everything was correct but the logon from the users would always get terminated at the desktop with invalid credentials.
After a short discussion and remote session and the error messages in the logs with an invalid CRL it was clear that was the issue. Troubleshooted the AIA/CRL locations and basically the defaults where still in play, explained that default push in AD isn’t a recommended approach. If any client can’t access the CRL it will give a deny on further actions (and other clients that don’t understand AD or are joined to AD won’t work as well).
Below screenshots depict a default ADCS installation which in turn pushes out the default legacy templates and also the CRL to LDAP which I see much too often at customers:
Resolution for the CRL error was to revoke all the certificates for usage with FAS, change the CRL/AIA location to a routable and reachable HTTP listener instead of LDAP (preferably an HA setup with a load-balancer in front of it) and push out the new CRL. Afterwards logons where using the SSO capabilities.
Hope it helps!
When configuring VMware UAG as an reverse proxy I’ve encountered some issues last year that as far as I could see wasn’t all to well documented. My reference article for the configuration was the following: https://techzone.vmware.com/configuring-web-reverse-proxy-identity-bridging-vmware-unified-access-gateway-vmware-workspace-one-operational-tutorial#985671
Basically when you follow it to the letter in your test deployment and with a test site you will not have a working reverse proxy URL. At the time when I encountered this I’ve logged a GSS support case and in the troubleshooting process it was clear that the proxy pattern set wasn’t working whatsoever, the correct one should be (|/(.*)|) instead of (|/intranet(.*)|)
My understanding was that if you would configure the instance id and configured the proxy pattern accordingly it would work but that wasn’t the case. Only when not referencing it and just passing it through it began to work.
When configuring multiple reverse proxy URL’s be sure to create corresponding proxy host patterns on the instance id’s
See the following screenshots for a working reference when using UAG as a reverse proxy for Exchange 2019 and Citrix StoreFront 1912
Hope it helps!
This was quite a nice one to troubleshoot, turns out there is a new configuration point for per app VPN and iOS devices, at least it was for me.
If you follow the configuration at https://www.citrix.com/blogs/2016/04/19/per-app-vpn-with-xenmobile-and-citrix-vpn/#:~:text=With%20the%20iOS%20per%20app,applications%20installed%20on%20the%20device. you’ll end up with a config that won’t open up a VPN when accessing the browser. Solution for this is to change the default provider type in the policy from App Proxy to Packet tunnel also mentioned here https://docs.citrix.com/en-us/xenmobile/server/policies/vpn-policy.html and explained it means the following:
Provider Type: A provider type indicates whether the provider is a VPN service or proxy service. For VPN service, choose Packet tunnel. For proxy service, choose App proxy.
Hope it helps!
I’ve been playing around with the Citrix ADC IP Reputation feature – https://docs.citrix.com/en-us/citrix-adc/13/reputation/ip-reputation.html in the lab for some time and to be honest it’s such a small but very effective feature which I almost never see active, why is that?
If you’ve gotten a premium licensed ADC appliance it’s a simple right click>enable and you put in the necessary arguments in a responder policy. See the following article for a quick how to video – https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WedxwiEVuG4 and basically that is it. The requests are going to be filtered on a Webroot service provider for malicious IP database and you can then drop those from ever getting at you network. (and put in a nifty log action so that you can filter as a syslog entry in Citrix ADM
I put a global responder in place with the expression: CLIENT.IP.SRC.IPREP_IS_MALICIOUS and a reset with accompanied log entry: CLIENT.IP.SRC + ” connection was dropped by Responder Action for malicious IP when accessing ” + HTTP.REQ.URL the results were pretty much mind blowing, see the following screenshot:Since the exploit CVE-2019-19781 – Vulnerability in Citrix Application Delivery Controller, Citrix Gateway, and Citrix SD-WAN WANOP appliance – https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX267027 the focus was pretty much around that but with the above rule in place I got more hits on the reputation feature than on the mitigation responder in that time. (And these are probes/attacks we don’t know about!)
So to sum it up this is a very good starting point if something like Application Firewall is a bridge to far but most definitely will improve your security with a simple setup.
Hope it helps.
I’ve updated my lab environment with Citrix Gateway push OTP support and had some trouble in configuring the Citrix SSO app on my iPhone. For some reason it couldn’t setup the gateway connection and it wasn’t reachable. (Well that was my bad in checking all my devices but I’ll get to that)
Before the push OTP change I’ve worked with the authenticator app behavior and put in the code myself and this worked fine. The change to push OTP isn’t too difficult, and the following articles give you plenty of how-to information:
Keep in mind that if you have setup a previous OTP setup like I had the encryption part needs to be migrated otherwise it just won’t work. Registration cannot complete if you just flip it on and be done with it. Follow the migration part or just start fresh with OTP encryption enabled by default.
After I corrected the encryption problem I still could not register through the Citrix SSO app for push OTP functionality. It kept giving me the error gateway not reachable, fully checked everything in my environment was up and working. It kept me puzzling that it works fine with the previous authenticator method and if I re-registered it that way it would work (without the push of course because that functionality sits in the Citrix SSO app)
Finally after more troubleshooting I found the problem… because I’ve upgraded and integrated ADFS 2019 in my environment my content switching server and gateway etc. also needed to be SNI aware. Remember that everything worked fine on my Windows devices (even the Citrix SSO VPN functionality which I use quite often) but just not on my iPhone. Turning off SNI was the solution, it seems that the Citrix SSO app on iOS doesn’t support SNI.
Hope it helps!
Quite recently I was at a customer where they had an SDX setup with single instances and needed to be upgraded and converted to an HA setup.
Well easy does it I created the instances on the second SDX and started creating HA sets. Numerous went fine and then one started giving errors. Could not propagate from the primary and after checking SSH/SCP access this would fail as well. I logged in through the console of SDX/SVM and saw that the sshd daemon wasn’t starting anymore. (On a side note all of the original SDX instances were upgraded in regard to the exploit of last December)
After some troubleshooting I came across the following discussion article: https://discussions.citrix.com/topic/405628-unable-to-connect-to-adc-nsip-version-121-and-130-using-sshsftp
The discussion referred to an support article regarding false positives and an SSH vulnerability:
After checking the sshd_config file and commenting out the following:
The sshd daemon started again and the HA propagation and synchronisation started instantly. I’ve had this on several other instances as well and they all needed the above commenting out of the lines.
Hope it helps!
While doing some lab work I came across an issue that the Domain Admin accounts could not register on the manageotp site while Domain Users could. This got me figuring it out.
For the use of Native OTP on the ADC we need to use an bind account for Active Directory which has the appropriate write permissions on the userParameters value of the users.
When we delegate control of the exact write permission of the userParameters everything is fine for normal users but administrator accounts won’t work. When we use a service account with full blown domain administrator permissions as the bind account then it works.
After some researching I came across this old article which explained the behavior:
Long story short, if any user is also a member of a high privileged group the AdminSDHolder protection will prevent this. There is a way that inheritance can be enabled but this is mostly not recommended as you will open up a whole lot of extra security risks.
If it isn’t needed then just delegate control of the needed permissions otherwise use an bind account with domain admin permissions.
For some in depth knowledge of AdminSDHolder and it’s workings see the following article:
Fun quick fact that I’ve encountered when deploying a ADC Gateway GSLB setup for a customer! You only have to enroll once with the nFactor/Native OTP on one of the ADC’s. (when having a Active Directory Domain across multiple datacenter sites)
The setup of choice:
- Two ADC appliances in HA set on each site
- GSLB enabled in active/passive mode for the Gateway across both sites
- Native OTP enabled and active as the way for authentication
- Active Directory Domain across two sites
There is no difference in configuration whatsoever because the magic of Native OTP depends on Active Directory.
Configure each ADC identically with the nFactor/Native OTP setup and enable GSLB and you’re done. I must admit at first I thought that I would need to enroll at both gateways independent but happily this is not the case.
For the configuration steps see common examples as below: